Length Estimate: Long (words > 1000)
“Whenever I talk to my officers, I say the environment is non-negotiable. But there is no viable alternative to developing more coal. Energy requirements have to be met.”
The above quote is from a detailed 2015 Guardian report on Indian electricity production, and captures perfectly the environment-growth dilemma that characterizes the serious contradictions contained in India’s approach to energy use.
Debates surrounding carbon emissions of India and China typically rely on argument that developing countries should not be subjected to the burden that is largely a result of fossil fuel-powered Western development. Having only recently recovered from the deleterious history of colonialism, the developing world is in no mood to again sacrifice its prosperity because of apparent Western greed and myopia. In fact, the impetus is on the developed world to cut its emissions drastically and let the developing world have its way with the planet.
Although seemingly rational, this argument contains its greatest strength in emotional appeal. The logical fallacies are many and are omitted here; they aren’t going to usefully alter the discourse anyway. Growth was promised and must be delivered – any international collaboration over environmental considerations must function within that constraint. What invalidates both the logical and emotional aspects of these growth-oriented arguments against restricting carbon emissions is simply the impact of climate change, which will not conveniently restrict itself to the perpetrators. Glaciers will melt in the Himalayas and sea levels will rise in the Southern coast; droughts will become ever more frequent and an increasing number of people will succumb to heat waves in the city. Top soil will erode and rain-fed rivers will dry up.
None of this is new information and the only controversial point is the time horizon: how long will it take to achieve the requisite development target and subsequently taper off emission growth? I am not as optimistic as Indian politicians, for two beliefs stated briefly: a) the world situation will deteriorate considerably by that time (2030) and b) adjusting to climate change after that will require a serious downgrade in living conditions, which itself defeats the point of lifting the living standards of 1.3 billion people. This is, of course, assuming that this timeline is not punctuated by massive climate-caused natural disasters that may derail these long-term expectations entirely.
The task of achieving both massive per-capita economic growth and environmental sustainability will be undertaken through an increase in coal production and solar energy capacity. India generated international headlines by setting itself the ambitious target of installing 100GW of solar capacity by 2022. ‘Ambitious’ is an understatement for a plan that seeks an annual installment that dwarfs anything achieved by the rest of the world till now. Central planning may be a thing of the past, but in India’s declaration we see more than a hint of the zeal that characterized early Soviet five-year plans. It is, suffice to say, a tall order for a country where the quality of public services and infrastructure struggles to keep up with the tempo of economic growth. Witness, for example, the drought earlier this year which necessitated the commission of water-carrying trains, or the scarcity of hospital beds as vector-spread diseases swept the National Capital Region, or the dispute over water resources in the South. These are just off the top of my head and don’t include the daily frictions of Indian life where corruption has long been a feature, although people still insist it is a bug.
There are, however, several questions beyond the Indian state’s capability of pursuing such a monumental program. Presently, most of India’s solar panels are imported at rock-bottom prices from China, where companies are running each other into the ground in a mad dash to market share. Indian manufacturers don’t presently have either the capacity or the production capability to match the installation demand. Prices are low in China mostly due to a slowdown in domestic demand, and these companies have been able to continue largely on the back of massive borrowing. A similar situation occurred in 2011, and lead to some major Chinese solar manufacturers going bankrupt. Given the precarious nature of the Chinese economy, which is facing a looming banking crisis – created by the same indiscriminate propping up of unviable enterprises – it will be interesting to see what happens once the supply of credit to solar companies runs out and panel prices cease being this low. Who will step in to satisfy the demand?
The demand, in any case, must be fueled by debt, some of which is being provided by international lending institutions. This leaves the program at the mercy of domestic financial flows as well as international capital – these need to be stable and readily available to enable the necessary annual installment. Furthermore, once this capacity is installed, it will be subject to purchase by distribution companies (“discoms”) which are in serious financial trouble and often restrict power supply when procurement costs exceed selling price. Although the cost of solar generated electricity is expected to achieve grid parity in the next few years (subject to subsidy), the issues with power distribution will need to be addressed for this electricity to not lie idle while cheaper coal-generated electricity is used instead. In summary, the program requires a level of fiscal outlay and administrative competence that makes it a rather steep hike compared to the path of least resistance that is coal.
However, let us give the Indian state the benefit of the doubt and even some preliminary applause. Then, we naturally arrive at the next question: what about the oil? India’s oil consumption has increased in lockstep with its GDP: it is now the third largest oil importer in the world. This appears to be an impressive feat, and at the very least, is a testament to rapid economic growth. Oil demand will only increase in the future as the economy and population expands, leaving the country ever more dependent on the foreign supply of an energy source that has no alternative. The present low price of oil may make this seem like a non-issue, but this is an ephemeral phenomenon resulting from an explosion of debt-fueled fracking operations and weak global demand. A return to high oil prices will have serious implications for the future of Indian economic growth. The absence of sustained efforts to build a resilient, high-capacity public transportation system or walkable cities that can effectively substitute for private car ownership and taxicabs will compound these problems. And of course, let us keep in mind the pollution and carbon emissions that all this oil use will produce.
This post serves as the beginning point for my inquiry into the Indian energy situation. I have suppressed somewhat darker thoughts about population size and carrying capacity, even though I believe these underlie much of what may/will go wrong with current efforts at achieving ‘sustainable development’. India today is characterized by its “economic miracle”, a point of pride for most middle- and upper-class Indians. In the face of other key governmental failures, this at least appears to be something to hold on to and build upon. At the same time, Indians are aware of the environmental impact of this phenomenon; there is no ideological opposition to climate change such as what is found in the United States. I don’t believe we can beat the clock and provide a minimum Western standard of living to 1.3 billion people while also sparing the environment from damage; in recognizing this Gandhi was most certainly prescient. In future posts, I seek to further my understanding of the ethical dimensions of this issue as well as possible alternatives and future paths.
Freedom is the birthright of all peoples; a consumption-driven idea of growth is not.
